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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Following his re-trial, David Joseph Meister appeals from his convictions 
for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Meister 
contends the district court abused its discretion in limiting the testimony of Dr. 
Richard Ofshe regarding the "weight and credibility" the jury should give Meister's 
confession. 
Statement Of The Facts 
"On December 11, 2001 Tonya Hart was shot twice in her home in 
Moscow, Idaho, which she shared with her boyfriend Jesse Linderman. The 
shooter approached the front entrance of Tonya's trailer and then proceeded to 
the back entrance." State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 238, 220 P.3d 1055, 1057 
(2009) (footnote omitted). 1 "The shooter then retreated behind the trailer, 
running through a snow covered field and eventually exiting the field on a nearby 
road." kl "A neighbor heard the gun shots and went to Tonya and Jesse's 
trailer. He then called 911 and proceeded unsuccessfully with resuscitation 
efforts." kl "Tonya was pronounced dead at the scene." kl 
"In August of 2002 the police interrogated David Meister in connection 
with Tonya's death and Meister confessed that he shot Tonya in exchange for a 
$1000 payment from Jesse Linderman." Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 
1057. The state charged Meister with first-degree murder and conspiracy to 
1 Jesse Linderman was also commonly known as "Shorty." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.814, 
L.3 - p.815, L.3.) 
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commit murder.2 !si Prior to trial, Meister claimed his confession should be 
suppressed because it was allegedly coerced, taken in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the entire interview was not videotaped. See 
Meister, 148 Idaho at 238 n.2, 220 P.3d at 1057 n.2. That motion was denied. 
(R., Vol. 5, pp.856-862.) 
"At trial Meister attempted to admit evidence that another individual, Lane 
Thomas, was responsible for Tonya's shooting." Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 
P.3d at 1057. "The district court refused any evidence which showed Thomas 
was an alternate perpetrator of the crime, including several confessions." !si A 
jury convicted Meister of both charges alleged. !si Meister appealed. See id. 
On appeal, Meister raised four issues: (1) "the state's failure to record his 
interview with the police as a violation of his due process rights because it left 
him without the evidentiary means to challenge the techniques used by the 
police during the interview";3 (2) error in the exclusion of "evidence of the 
prosecutor's admission that the state did not have sufficient evidence to convict 
Linderman of conspiring with Meister to commit murder"; (3) error in the 
exclusion of alternate perpetrator evidence proffered by Meister; (4) denial of his 
motion for a new trial; and (4) violation of his rights at sentencing. Meister, 2007 
2 The state also charged Linderman with conspiracy to commit murder, but the 
charge was later dismissed "because the only evidence tying Linderman to the 
crime was Meister's confession." Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057. 
3 Meister did not pursue on appeal the other grounds asserted in the district court 
in support of his request for suppression. State v. Meister, 2007 WL 2821981 *2 
n.2. (2007), review granted and opinion vacated by Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 
P.3d 1055. 
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WL 2821981 at *3-17. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded the "district court 
did not err in admitting evidence of Meister's confession and in excluding 
evidence related to Meister's co-conspirator." kL at *17. The Court, however, 
found error in the district court's failure to admit the alternate perpetrator 
evidence and at sentencing. kL The state filed a petition for review, which the 
Idaho Supreme Court granted. Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057. 
The only issues presented on review related to the admissibility of the 
alternate perpetrator evidence and the sentencing error alleged by Meister and 
found by the Court of Appeals. Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057. 
The admissibility of Meister's confession was not presented to the Idaho 
Supreme Court for consideration. kL at n.2. Addressing the alternate 
perpetrator issue, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the relevant legal standard 
for admissibility of such evidence and concluded the "district court applied the 
wrong legal standard to determine whether Lane Thomas' confessions should be 
excluded." Meister, 148 Idaho at 243, 220 P.3d at 1062. Accordingly, the Court 
vacated Meister's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.4 kL 
On remand, and prior to the second trial, the state filed a motion asking 
the district court to apply the law of the case doctrine and preclude Meister from 
re-litigating any issue addressed by either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court, including Meister's request to suppress his confessions. (R., Vol. 2, 
pp.297-306.) After briefing and argument, the district court entered an opinion 
4 Because the Court vacated Meister's conviction and remanded his case for a 
new trial, it declined to address the sentencing issue. Meister, 148 Idaho at 243, 
220 P.3d at 1062. 
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and order on the state's motion, granting the motion "with respect to the 
determinations set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Meister, 148 
Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009)," and "with respect to rulings of the district 
court which were not appealed after the first trial, unless a showing [could] be 
made that a decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice" 
but denying the motion with "respect to the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion." (R., 
p.354.) 
In light of the district court's ruling, Meister again sought suppression of 
his confessions on the same bases previously asserted - coercion, an alleged 
Miranda violation, and as punishment for the failure to record the entirety of 
Meister's interview with police. (R., Vol. 2, pp.368-427; R., Vol. 3, pp.487-518.) 
As part of his request for suppression, Meister stated his intent to "rely on the 
testimony of Richard Ofshe, Ph.D., to fully explain the coercive nature of the 
interrogation." (R., p.513.) The court held a hearing on Meister's suppression at 
which Dr. Ofshe testified. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1512-1556.) The court subsequently 
entered an order denying Meister's request to exclude his confession. (R., 
pp.1069, 1074-1080.) 
After the court denied Meister's renewed efforts to suppress his 
confession, the state filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent Dr. Ofshe from 
testifying at trial. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1472-1478.) Meister filed a written response (R., 
Vol. 7, pp.1502-1579) and at the hearing on the state's motion, asked the court 
to deny the motion "at least to the extent that it would prevent Dr. Ofshe from 
talking - or from testifying that false confessions do, in fact, exist, and what his 
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training and experience and education has shown to be the milieu in which they 
arise" (6/27/2011 Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.2). Meister also argued that Dr. Ofshe 
should be allowed to testify about "the fact that the State failed, although it had 
ample opportunity, to record the interrogation and at least the first two of three 
statements made by [him]." (6/27/2011 Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36, L.4.) The court 
took the matter under advisement and later entered a written order, summarizing 
its ruling as follows: 
Dr. Ofshe is prohibited from testifying regarding the voluntariness 
of Meister's confession and whether the confession was true or 
false. Further, Dr. Ofshe is prohibited from offering an opinion 
regarding the lack of a full recording of the August 29, 2001 
interaction between Meister and law enforcement. The State's 
motion in limine is denied with respect to the presentation of the 
general subject of false confession and how false confessions are 
created. 
(R., Vol. 8, pp.1591-1592.) 
After a 23-day trial, a jury again convicted Meister of first-degree murder 
and conspiracy to commit murder. (R., Vol. 9, p.1934.) The court imposed 
concurrent fixed life sentences. (R., Vol. 9, pp.2005-2008.) Meister timely 
appealed. (R., Vol. 9, pp.2011-2020.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Meister states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by precluding Dr. Ofshe 
from testifying specifically to the procedures associated with Mr. 
Meister's confession? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Meister failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his request to have Dr. Ofshe testify about the "weight and credibility" 
the jury should give Meister's confession? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
Meister Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Limiting Dr. Ofshe's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Meister asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
"request to question Dr. Ofshe regarding the application of his theory to the facts 
of this case" so the jury could decide what "weight and credibility" to give 
Meister's confession. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Application of the law to the facts 
shows Meister's claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011 ). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will 
not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Winn, 121 
Idaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992). "A lower court does not abuse its 
discretion if the court correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion, acted 
within the bounds of its discretion, and reached its decision by exercising 
reason." State v. Almaraz, 155 Idaho 584, _, 301 P.2d 242, 258 (2013 
(citations omitted). 
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C. Meister Has Failed To Show Error In Relation To The Limitations On Dr. 
Ofshe's Testimony 
Expert testimony is only admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 
702. "[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 1.R.E. 
702. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at 
or before the hearing." I.R.E. 703. Although I.R.E. 704 allows "[t]estimony in the 
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible" even if it "embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact," it is well-established that 
"[e]xpert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another witness 
encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility 
determinations, and therefore does not assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 
702." Almaraz, 154 Idaho at _, 301 P.3d at 257 (quotations and citation 
omitted). In other words, "an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is [only] 
admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require the 
expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed 
evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury's function." 
~at_, 301 P.3d at 257-258 (quotations and citations omitted). 
The district court cited the relevant legal standards prior to trial in 
determining the proper scope of Dr. Ofshe's testimony and allowing him to testify 
about "the general subject of false confession and how false confessions are 
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created" (R., Vol. 8, p.1592), which was precisely what Meister requested 
(6/27/2011 Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.2 (Meister asking that Dr. Ofshe be permitted 
to testify about the existence of false confessions and the "milieu in which they 
arise")). Dr. Ofshe did just that, testifying at length and in detail about the 20 
years of work he has devoted to "the subject of influence in police interrogation." 
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2939, Ls.3-5; see generally Tr., Vol. 4, pp.2939-3004.) Dr. Ofshe 
specifically explained his expertise in this area as follows: 
My work has been in -- focused on understanding the tactics 
and techniques of influence that are used in police interrogation, 
actually studying police interrogations from records where records 
are audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts and even debriefing people 
who have been interrogated in unrecorded interrogations; but 
principally, through the study of actual records of police 
interrogation. 
My work has been focused on understanding how 
interrogation works in general, how it is that someone who initially 
denies involvement in a crime can be gotten to rethink their position 
and admit they, indeed, did commit the crime and then give a 
confession to the crime. And also to understand how it is that 
someone who did not commit the crime can be gotten to rethink 
their position, decide to offer a confession, and then make up a 
confession to the crime that's being investigated. 
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2939, L.9 - p.2940, L.1.) 
Dr. Ofshe, using "a diagram to illustrate[ ] it," then explained why 
"someone would confess to doing something they didn't actually do." (Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.2952, L.1 - p.2953, L.3.) In providing his explanation to the jury, Dr. Ofshe 
highlighted techniques used by law enforcement in interviewing suspects and the 
purpose of those techniques, including a lengthy description of the Reid method 
of interrogation as well as criticisms of that method. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2957, L.10 -
p.2969, L.9, p.2978, Ls.9-18, p.2979, L.6 - p.2989, L.16.) Dr. Ofshe also 
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described three types of "false confessions" - voluntary, compliant, and 
persuaded - and testified the diagram he used to illustrate his testimony applied 
to compliant false confessions. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2973, L.15 - p.2975, L.6.) And, 
Dr. Ofshe explained the analysis for determining whether a confession is reliable 
and the factors he would consider in assessing the validity of a confession. (Tr., 
Vol. 4, p.2997, L.15 - p.2998, L.9, p.3003, L.3 - p.3004, L.7.) 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Ofshe about his work and 
publications on the issue of false confessions, including his claim that he has 
reviewed over a thousand interrogations. (Tr., Vol. 4, pp.3013-3024, p.3026, 
Ls.3-5.) When asked how many of those interrogations he found resulted in 
false confessions, Dr. Ofshe said he did not have "any idea" but ultimately 
agreed with the principle that no one knows the rate of either false or truthful 
confessions. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3026, L.6 - p.3028, L.1.) 
Following cross-examination, defense counsel asked the court "for 
permission to question Mr. Ofshe about the application of his theory to the facts 
of this case." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3029, Ls.4-6.) Defense counsel argued: 
And the reason I do that, Your Honor, is because the State has 
opened the door to that. They obtained a pretrial ruling that he 
could not opine whether or not his confession was a false one. 
Having obtained that ruling, then impeach him through repeated 
questioning of how many of the cases he reviewed does he believe 
to be false confessions. 
So, the State is going to have its cake and eat it too, saying 
the defense can't ask for an opinion, but we're -- we're going to 
impeach them just as if he gave the opinion. And the jury is left 
with a misimpression that we have gotten from Mr. Ofshe that he 
thinks [Meister's] confession is false. And they're going to go in the 
jury room and talk about it and say, well, that lawyer told us this, 
and then the expert never said that the confession was false. And 
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the State undercut him, where he wouldn't say how many of the 
thousands. 
So, we have been -- [Meister] has been greatly prejudiced 
by this line of attack. And the only way to remedy -- remedy that, 
Your Honor, is to let Dr. Ofshe give his conclusion. And I don't 
mean his conclusion that Mr. Meister's confession is false. We've 
never asked that. It was never our intention. But simply allow Dr. 
Ofshe to testify how the facts of this case specifically operate in the 
diagram that he explained yesterday. 
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.3029, L.7 - p.3030, L.7.) 
The court denied Meister's request, rejecting Meister's assertion that the 
door had "been opened to allow that line of questioning in this case."5 (Tr., Vol. 
4, p.3032, Ls.6-10.) Meister contends this ruling was an abuse of discretion. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Meister is incorrect. The question presented to the 
district court following the prosecutor's cross-examination was whether that 
examination "opened the door" to allowing Dr. Ofshe to "testify how the facts of 
this case specifically operate in the diagram" that he used to illustrate his 
testimony. It did not. The scope of Dr. Ofshe's testimony on direct was precisely 
what Meister requested pre-trial. That the state elicited testimony on cross-
examination that Dr. Ofshe did not know how many of the cases he reviewed 
involved a false confession and agreed that no one knows the rate of true or 
false confessions in no way "opened the door" to testimony about how his theory 
applied to the facts of Meister's case. Indeed, the ultimate point made by the 
5 The court did not elaborate on the basis for its conclusion that the state did not 
open the door. However, in response to Meister's claim that it did, the 
prosecutor noted her questioning on cross-examination only illustrated that Dr. 
Ofshe's model, which he presented to the jury, was not reliable because it is 
based on his own interpretation of the facts and there was "really not any way for 
him to test his theory." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3031, Ls.6-20.) 
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cross-examination Meister claimed "opened the door" was that there is no way to 
know whether a confession is true or false - a principle that Dr. Ofshe 
acknowledged on direct. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2959, Ls.3-5.) 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Meister's 
argument that the state "opened the door" to allow additional testimony from Dr. 
Ofshe regarding application of his theory to Meister's confession. 
Even if the Court addresses the question of whether Dr. Ofshe should 
have been permitted to "testify how the facts of this case specifically operate in 
the diagram" he drew for the jury, Meister has failed to show the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Meister's request. Before addressing the merits 
of this issue, it is important to first try and understand what Meister meant when 
he sought permission to have Dr. Ofshe "testify how the facts of this case 
specifically operate in the diagram that he explained" to the jury. (Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.3030, Ls.5-6.) It is clear from the record that Meister was not asking that Dr. 
Ofshe be allowed to offer "his conclusion" that the "confession is false." (Tr., Vol. 
4, p.3030, Ls.2-4.) But, when Meister made the request, he did not articulate 
specifically what testimony he wanted Dr. Ofshe to give that had not already 
been elicited. 
The information that can be gleaned from the record in this regard 
occurred during a break in the state's cross-examination of Dr. Ofshe, and 
before Meister's request to expand the scope of Dr. Ofshe's testimony, at which 
time Meister inquired whether the court would "deem the record sufficient in 
terms of an offer of proof from Dr. Ofshe on the parts of his testimony that have 
12 
been excluded by [the] pretrial ruling," referring to Dr. Ofshe's testimony during 
the pretrial motion hearing. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3019, L.11 - p.3020, L.2.) The state 
did not object and the court "grant[ed] the request to take that pretrial testimony 
as an offer of proof." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3020, Ls.7-13.) Nevertheless, Meister did 
not identify what aspect of that testimony he wanted to elicit on redirect and his 
offer of proof was made in relation to "the parts of [Dr. Ofshe's] testimony that 
[were] excluded by [the] pretrial ruling."6 (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3019, Ls.11-16.) As 
previously noted, the pretrial ruling excluded testimony "regarding the 
voluntariness of Meister's confession and whether the confession was true or 
false" and "offering an opinion regarding the lack of a full recording of the August 
29, 2001 interaction between Meister and law enforcement." (R., Vol. 8, 
pp.1591-1592.) Since Meister expressly stated his request to have Dr. Ofshe 
"testify how the facts of this case specifically operate in the diagram" did not 
include "his conclusion that Mr. Meister's confession was false," the state can 
only assume, based on his reference to the testimony excluded by the pretrial 
ruling, that his request related to the voluntariness of the confession or the lack 
6 It is the defendant's burden to provide an offer of proof in support of his claim 
that evidence should be admitted. See I.R.E. 103(a)(2); State v. Harvey, 142 
Idaho 527,536, 129 P.3d 1276, 1285 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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of a full recording.7 Based on his argument on appeal, Meister seems to pursue 
the former. (See Appellant's Brief, p.22 ("Dr. Ofshe should have been permitted 
to discuss the specific questions and procedures employed by Detective 
Westbrook without commenting on whether he believed Mr. Meister or Detective 
Westbrook to be credible.").) 
Meister first argues that, by not allowing Dr. Ofshe to apply his expertise 
to the facts of the case, he was deprived of the opportunity to challenge the 
"weight and credibility" of his confession. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) In support of 
this argument, Meister relies on Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002), an 
Indiana case in which Dr. Ofshe testified, asserting the case is "directly on point." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Meister's argument fails. 
The whole purpose of Dr. Ofshe's testimony, which was heard by the jury, 
was to provide them the framework for evaluating whether Meister's confession 
was credible. Any contrary position taken by Meister is without merit and it is 
unclear why Meister believes Dr. Ofshe's inability to "apply his expertise to the 
7 Although the court excluded evidence of Dr. Ofshe's opinions related to the 
failure to record, during direct examination, Dr. Ofshe made several comments 
about the importance of recording, even linking recording to "professionalism." 
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2948, L.25 - p.2949, L.12, p.2950, Ls.3-11, p.2968, Ls.20-24.) 
Although the prosecutor did not object to Dr. Ofshe's comments while he was 
testifying, at a recess during his testimony, she stated her position that his 
comments about recording were not "appropriate" in light of the court's pre-trial 
ruling and asked that he "be admonished not to make such comments." (Tr., 
Vol. 4, p.2970, Ls.4-11.) The court recognized the prosecutor's concern but 
stated Dr. Ofshe had not yet gone "beyond" the court's ruling. (Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.2970, Ls.12-22.) Defense counsel also appeared to recognize the concern, 
noting he had asked Dr. Ofshe "during the break" not to "use the word 'record' 
anymore in his testimony" in an effort to abide by the court's ruling. (Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.2970, L.23 - p.2971, L.5.) 
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facts of this case," precluded him from challenging the "weight and credibility" of 
his confession since that is precisely what he did not only through Dr Ofshe's 
testimony, but through his own testimony as well the cross-examination of 
Detective Edward Westbrook to whom Meister confessed. (See generally Tr., 
Vol. 3, pp.2101-2106, 2114-2212 (cross-examination of Detective Westbrook); 
Tr., Vol. 5, pp.3146-3241 (Meister's testimony claiming his confession was false 
and coerced).) Indeed, it is difficult to believe Meister's request to allow Dr. 
Ofshe to provide testimony beyond that allowed by the district court would have 
resulted in anything but an opinion on the credibility of Meister's statements to 
law enforcement, which is prohibited by the Rules of Evidence. Almaraz, supra. 
Meister's reliance on the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Miller is 
misplaced because Meister presented the very testimony the court in Miller held 
was erroneously excluded in that case. In Miller, the trial court precluded Dr. 
Ofshe from presenting any testimony to the jury. 770 N. E.2d at 772 ("Dr. Ofshe 
did not present any testimony to the jury"). On appeal, the Indiana Supreme 
Court held that exclusion of Dr. Ofshe's testimony was erroneous, reasoning: 
In the present case, the fact that the content of the 
interrogation was not in dispute is not a proper basis on which to 
exclude Dr. Ofshe's testimony. The defendant's trial strategy 
clearly included his challenge to the voluntariness of the 
incriminatory statements in his videotaped police interview. The 
trial court's threshold determination of sufficient voluntariness for 
admissibility of the videotape did not preclude the defendant's 
challenge to its weight and credibility at trial. From our review of 
the circumstances in the present case, the general substance of 
Dr. Ofshe's testimony would have assisted the jury regarding the 
psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation of mentally 
retarded persons, topics outside the common knowledge and 
experience. In the event that some of Dr. Ofshe's testimony to the 
jury would have invaded Rule 704(b)'s prohibition of opinion 
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testimony as to the truth or falsity of the defendant's statements, 
the trial court could have sustained individualized objections at trial. 
Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 773-774. 
Meister got exactly what Miller did not - Dr. Ofshe's testimony "regarding 
the psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation." What he did not get, 
and what he was not entitled to, was Dr. Ofshe's opinion that his confession was 
the product of coercion, i.e., was not credible. 
Meister also relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301 P.3d 242. 8 Relevant to this case, the Court in 
Almaraz addressed whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled 
that a defense expert could not testify about specific procedures employed in 
obtaining an eyewitness identification using a photograph. kl at_, 301 P.3d 
at 257-258. The Court held: 
Here, the district court abused its discretion when it ruled 
that Dr. Reisberg could not testify about the specific procedures 
used in [the eyewitness] Hust's interview. In making its ruling, the 
court excluded the testimony as invading the province of the jury 
without making a determination as to whether it would have 
assisted the jury. The district court was correct that expert opinion 
testimony as to the accuracy of Hust's identification would invade 
the province of the jury, but Dr. Reisberg's testimony was not an 
opinion as to Hust' s credibility. Rather, Dr. Reisberg would have 
testified about the specific instances of police suggestiveness, 
which would have been helpful to the average juror's understanding 
of whether the interview was conducted in an overly suggestive 
way. Courts should not overly restrict testimony that assists the 
jury. 
8 The Court issued its opinion in Almaraz, supra, on April 1, 2013, nearly 18 
months after Dr. Ofshe testified at Meister's trial. The state does not suggest the 
timing of the Almaraz opinion means it is not controlling; it is only noted for the 
purpose of acknowledging that the district court could not have considered it as 
part of its analysis. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court "still recognize[d] that an expert 
cannot opine to the accuracy of the eyewitness identification or the credibility of 
any witness as those matters are reserved for the jury." Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 
_, 301 P.3d at 258. "However, an expert witness may testify to specific 
instances of police suggestiveness that may call into question the reliability of the 
eyewitness testimony." kl For example, "[t]estimony relating to the proper 
guidelines for conducting an accurate interview or lineup, whether or not those 
procedures were followed in the case at hand, and the consequences of non-
compliance with those procedures does not invade the province of the jury." kl 
The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded Dr. Reisberg should have been 
allowed to testify about the "specific procedures employed" by the officer 
conducting the identification and "how empirical research has shown those 
procedures to be suggestive," which did not constitute an "opinion on the 
credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness testimony itself." kl 
Meister "submits the only distinction between this case and Almaraz is 
that Almaraz concerned an eyewitness identification expert and this case 
concerns a false confession expert," a distinction he contends has "no legal 
difference." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) To the contrary, the distinction is apparent 
when the Court considers the content of the testimony authorized by Almaraz -
"the proper guidelines for conducting an accurate interview or lineup, whether or 
not those procedures were followed in the case at hand, and the consequences 
of non-compliance with those procedures." Alamraz at_, 301 P.3d at 258. 
17 
There are no "proper guidelines" for interviewing a suspect other than those 
commanded by the state and federal constitutions. Whether those constitutional 
requirements are satisfied is a legal question for the courts to resolve, and a 
question that was resolved against Meister in this case. Although it may be 
appropriate to provide the jury with information explaining that confessions can 
be obtained as a result of using certain tactics, like those Dr. Ofshe testified to, 
allowing Dr. Ofshe to "discuss the specific questions and procedures employed 
by Detective Westbrook" (Appellant's Brief, p.22) and show how those questions 
and procedures fit within his coercion theory is the same as allowing Dr. Ofshe to 
state his opinion that Meister's confession was coerced and should, therefore, 
not be given any weight because it was not credible. Unlike attacking the 
reliability of an eyewitness identification, which the witness believes to be true, 
Meister's request, at its core, involved having Dr. Ofshe attack the credibility of 
Meister's own statements, which Meister testified he knew to be false. That goes 
beyond the point of what is permissible and would "require [Dr. Ofshe] to pass 
upon the credibility" and weight of Meister's confession. Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 
_, 301 P.3d at 257-258. As such, Meister has failed to establish the district 
court erred in precluding Dr. Ofshe from applying his false confession theories to 
the facts of this case. 
Even if Meister has met his burden of showing error, any error is 
harmless. "Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously 
objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test." 
kl at_, 301 P.3d at 258-259 (citation omitted). "[T]he error is harmless if the 
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Court finds that the result would be the same without the error." KL. at _, 
301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted). 
Although Dr. Ofshe did not identify "specific questions and procedures 
employed by Detective Westbrook" he believed were coercive, as Meister 
contends he should have been allowed to do (Appellant's Brief, p.22), there is no 
reason to conclude the jury could not identify those questions and procedures 
using the information provided by Dr. Ofshe. Indeed, Dr. Ofshe even told the 
jury: "I see my job as doing everything possible to help the people who are going 
to make that judgment to make the most intelligent, well-informed judgment that 
they can based on understanding how interrogation works and understanding 
what's important about the result of an interrogation. I'm a teacher." (Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.3050, L.22 - p.3051, L.3.) Dr. Ofshe, in addition to providing the jury with 
extensive information on police tactics and coerced confessions, gave the jury a 
list of factors to use in assessing the validity of Meister's confession (Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.3003, L.3 - p.3004, L.7.) The jury had the opportunity to assess Meister's 
confession based on this information and based on the testimony of Detective 
Westbrook and Meister and in the context of all of the other evidence presented 
at trial. Based on this alone, this Court can easily conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the result would have been the same even if Dr. Ofshe 
identified Detective Westbrook's tactics for the jury. 
Beyond that, the weight of the evidence against Meister was 
overwhelming and was not solely dependent on Meister's confession. The 
prosecutor cogently summarized the case against Meister in her closing 
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argument. (Tr., Vol. 6, p.3950, L.24 - p.4016, L.13.) Among the evidence 
presented was the testimony of Michael Garrison. (Tr., Vol. 3, pp.2265-2315.) 
Garrison testified that he sold a High Point 9mm handgun and a box of 
ammunition to Meister just a few days before Tonya's murder - the same type of 
gun and ammunition used to kill Tonya. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1470, L.24-p.1473, L.17; 
Tr., Vol. 3, p.2274, Ls.9-15, p.2276, Ls.10-16, p.2287, L.13 - p.2289, L.7.) 
Meister declined to complete a bill of sale for the purchase and when asked why 
he wanted the gun, Meister "mentioned something along the lines of, I'm going to 
shoot somebody in the face." (Tr., Vol. 3, p.2280, L.23 - p.2281, L.20.) The 
owner's manual for the gun was subsequently found under the refrigerator where 
Meister lived. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.3288, Ls.9-15.) 
Consistent with what Meister told Garrison regarding why he wanted the 
gun, James Collyer testified that he saw Meister a few weeks after the murder 
and they were watching "one of those real life detective shows" and Meister said 
he "killed somebody once." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2910, L.3 - p.2912, L.21.) Meister 
then proceeded to tell Collyer he "had been given $1,000 to kill a girlfriend of a 
co-worker," "that he went up to the trailer house, knocked on the door" and 
"when she answered the door, he shot her in the face" and then "shot her in the 
chest." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2912, L.22 - p.2913, L.5.) Meister said he "stashed some 
clothes and some shoes in a low spot in a field," changed his shoes, "took the 
gun and the other shoes and dumped them in a dumpster or a garbage can." 
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2913, Ls.6-14.) 
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Among some of the most damning evidence was Meister's response to 
Garrison's and Collyer's testimony. Unsurprisingly, Meister took the position that 
Garrison and Collyer were both lying with respect to the incriminating statements 
he made to them. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.3365, L.10- p.3366, L.4, p.3367, L.1 -p.3368, 
L.24.) Indeed, Meister accused a number of the state's witnesses of lying. (Tr., 
Vol. 5, pp.3359-3362 (Meister claims Jeremy Hogan lied about Meister offering 
him a box of 9mm ammunition); p.3366 (Meister claims Marty Collyer must have 
"misunderstood" when he said Meister told him someone gave him money to buy 
the gun); p.3354 (Meister claims Duane Scott lied); pp.3383-3384, 3439 (Meister 
claiming some of the officers who testified lied).) 
Meister did, however, admit he bought a gun from Garrison but testified to 
what can only be characterized as a far-fetched explanation of his purpose in 
buying it and his disposition of it within a day of buying it. According to Meister, 
he bought the gun to "experiment" with "the idea of owning and possessing a 
gun, maybe to go out and shoot the gun" or to "explore" "possibly selling" 
weapons to "make a couple of bucks here and there." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3086, Ls.1-
24.) Upon getting the gun and ammunition, Meister claimed he examined it after 
it was delivered to him at work, threw away the box and accessories on the way 
home after work, thought about hiding it under the refrigerator but it did not fit, 
apparently losing the owner's manual under the refrigerator in the process 
(since, for some unknown reason, it did not get thrown away with the box), and 
ultimately decided to take it to a party the next day, where he carried it in his 
waistband with the box of ammunition alternating between various pockets. (See 
?1 ... ' 
generally Tr., Vol. 4, pp.3100-3113; Tr., Vol. 5, pp.3299-3307) Meister testified 
he took the gun to the party thinking he might either sell it to someone there, like 
someone under 21 or a felon who could not buy a gun legally, or go out shooting 
with his friends later. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3111, Ls.6-12; Tr., Vol. 5, p.3305, L.20 -
p.3306, L.7.) Deciding to pursue a sale once at the party, Meister testified he 
approached a stranger and asked if he wanted to buy it; the stranger was not 
interested. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3116, L.17 - p.3117, L.22.) But, luckily for Meister, 
another stranger, having heard there was a gun for sale, approached him shortly 
thereafter and asked to buy the gun and produced $250.00 cash for the 
purchase. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3118, L.1 - p.3119, L.21.) Of course, being a stranger, 
Meister did not know the buyer's name, and did not ask for a name nor would he 
have given his own since it was an "illegal" transaction, but Meister was able to 
recall that the buyer wore a "warm-colored shirt" and a "close fitting necklace" 
made of shells or bamboo. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3118, L.1 - p.3120, L.18.) 
Given the nature of the evidence Meister claims was improperly excluded 
and the overwhelming evidence of Meister's guilt, any error related to the 
limitations on Dr. Ofshe's testimony was harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction 
entered upon the jury verdicts finding Meister guilty of conspiracy to commit 
murder and first degree murder. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2013. 
~ 
JES~ICA M. LORELLO 
Depl;ty Attorney General 
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